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Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation
[99, 96, 1, 56, 74, 90, 76, 92, 89, 50, 18, 16]. Existing models of indirect reci-
procity fail to robustly support social cooperation: image scoring models
[74] fail to provide robust incentives, while social standing models [96, 63,
85, 93] are not informationally robust. Here we provide a new model of in-
direct reciprocity based on simple, decentralized records: each individual’s
record depends on their own past behavior alone, and not on their partners’
past behavior or their partners’ partners’ past behavior. When social dilem-
mas exhibit a coordination motive (or strategic complementarity), tolerant
trigger strategies based on simple records can robustly support positive so-
cial cooperation and exhibit strong stability properties. In the opposite case
of strategic substitutability, positive social cooperation cannot be robustly
supported. Thus, the strength of short-run coordination motives in social
dilemmas determines the prospects for robust long-run cooperation.
People (and perhaps also other animals) often trust each other to cooperate even
when they know they will never meet again. Such indirect reciprocity relies on indi-
viduals having some information about how their partners have behaved in the past.
Existing models of indirect reciprocity fall into two paradigms. In the image scoring
paradigm, each individual carries an image that improves when they help others, and
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(at least some) individuals help only those with good images. In the standing paradigm,
each individual carries a standing that (typically) improves when they help others with
good standing, but not when they help those with bad standing, and individuals with
good standing help only other good-standing individuals.
Neither of these paradigms provides a robust explanation for social cooperation. In
image-scoring models, there is no reason for an individual to only help partners with
good images: since the partner’s image does not affect one’s future payoff, helping some
partners and not others is optimal only if one is completely indifferent between helping
and not helping. In game-theoretic terms, individuals never have strict incentives to
follow image-scoring strategies, and hence such strategies can form at best a weak equi-
librium. Closely related to this point, image-scoring equilibria are unstable in several
environments [63, 85]. Standing models do yield strict, stable equilibria, but they fail
to be informationally robust: computing an individual’s standing requires knowledge
of not only their own past behavior, but also their past partners’ behavior, their part-
ners’ partners’ behavior, and so on ad infinitum. Such infinite-order information is
likely unavailable in many societies [76].
We develop a new theoretical paradigm for modeling indirect reciprocity that sup-
ports positive social cooperation as a strict, stable equilibrium while relying only on
simple, individualistic information: when two players meet, they observe each other’s
records and nothing else, and each individual’s record depends only on their own past
behavior. (Individualistic information is also called “first-order” [98, 47, 11, 79].)
As our model of individual interaction, we use the classic prisoner’s dilemma (“PD”)
with actions C,D (“Cooperate,” “Defect”) and a standard payoff normalization, with
g, l > 0 and g − l < 1—see the top panel in Fig. 1. This canonical game can capture
many two-sided interactions, such as business partnerships [58], management of public
resources [44, 83], and risk-sharing in developing societies [23], as well as many well-
documented animal behaviors [30].
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Figure 1: The prisoner’s dilemma. The top panel shows how any prisoner’s
dilemma can be represented by the standard normalization with g = (T −R)/(R−P )
and l = (P − S)/(R − P ), where T > R > P > S. The bottom panel illustrates this
normalization for “donation games” in which choosing G (Give) instead of S (Shirk)
incurs a personal cost c and gives benefit b > c to the opponent.
A critical feature of the PD is whether it exhibits strategic complementarity or
strategic substitutability. Strategic complementarity means that the gain from playing
D is greater when the opponent also plays D. In the PD payoff matrix displayed in
Fig. 1, this corresponds to the condition
g < l. (Strategic Complementarity)
Strategic complementarity is a common case in realistic social dilemmas: it implies that
although D is selfishly optimal regardless of the partner’s action (a defining feature
of the PD), the social dilemma nonetheless retains some aspect of a coordination or
stag-hunt game, so that playing C is less costly when one’s partner also plays C.
For example, mobbing a predator is always risky (hence costly) for each individual,
but it is much less risky when others also mob [104]. The opposite case of strategic
substitutability arises when the gain from playing D is greater when the opponent plays
C: mathematically, this occurs when
g > l. (Strategic Substitutability)
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The distinction between strategic complementarity and substitutability has long been
known to be of critical importance in economics [22, 41], but its implications for the
evolution of cooperation have not previously been assessed.
In our model, each player’s record is an integer that tracks how many times that
player has defected. Newborn players have record 0. Whenever an individual plays
D, their record increases by 1. Whenever an individual plays C, their record remains
constant with probability 1 − ε and increases by 1 with probability ε; thus, ε ∈ (0, 1)
measures the amount of noise in the system, which can reflect either errors in recording
or errors in executing the intended action. An individual’s record is considered to be
“good” if the number of times the individual has been recorded as playing D is less than
some pre-specified threshold K: this individualistic scoring is similar to image-scoring
models. When two individuals meet, they both play C if and only if they both have
good records: this conditioning on the partner’s record is similar to standing models.
We call these strategies tolerant trigger strategies or GrimK, as they are a form of the
well-known grim trigger strategies [37] with a “tolerance” of K recorded plays of D.
We analyze the steady-state equilibria of a system where the total population size
is constant, but each individual has a geometrically distributed lifetime [79]. To ensure
robustness, we insist that equilibrium behavior is strictly optimal at every record; in
classical (normal-form) games, this implies that the equilibrium is evolutionarily stable
[95, 103].
We show that GrimK strategies can form a strict steady-state equilibrium if and
only if the PD exhibits substantial strategic complementarity, in that the gain from
playing D rather than C is significantly greater when the opponent plays D: the
precise condition required in the PD payoff matrix displayed in Fig. 1 is
g <
l
1 + l
.
Most previous studies of indirect reciprocity restrict attention to the “donation
game” instance of the PD [92] where g = l—see the bottom panel in Fig. 1. Our
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analysis reveals this to be a knife-edge case that obscures the distinction between
strategic complementarity (g < l) and substitutability (g > l). (However, the g 6= l
case has also received significant attention: for example, the seminal article of Axelrod
and Hamilton [3] took g = 1 and l = 1/2.) We show that the tolerance level K can
be tuned so that GrimK strategies robustly support positive social cooperation in the
presence of sufficiently strong strategic complementarity.
To see how to tune the threshold K, note that since even individuals who always
try to cooperate are sometimes recorded as playing D due to noise, K must be large
enough that the steady-state share of the population with good records is sufficiently
high: with any fixed value of K, a population of sufficiently long-lived players would
almost all have bad records. However, K also cannot be too high, as otherwise an
individual with a very good record (that is, a very low number of D’s) can safely play
D until their record approaches the threshold. Another constraint is that an individual
with record K − 1 who meets a partner with a bad record must not be tempted to
deviate to C to preserve their own good record. These constraints lead to an upper
bound on the maximum share of cooperators in equilibrium. As lifetimes become long
and noise becomes small, this upper bound converges to 0 whenever g > l/(1 + l)
and to l/(1 + l) whenever g < l/(1 + l)—see Table 1—and we show that this share of
cooperators can in fact be attained in equilibrium in the (γ, ε) → (1, 0) limit. Thus,
greater strategic complementarity (higher l and lower g) not only helps support some
cooperation; it also increases the maximum level of cooperation in the limit, as shown
in Fig. 2.
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Table 1: Upper bounds on cooperation. The entries are upper bounds on the
share of cooperators possible in equilibria for various γ and ε values when g = 0.5 and
l = 2.5, with a darker shade indicating a higher value as shown in the scale at right.
As we move to the bottom right, the upper bound converges to l/(1+ l) ≈ .7143, which
is the maximum share of cooperators sustainable in the limit, but away from the limit
the upper bound can be different (the values in this table are all higher, but this is not
the case for small γ or large ε).
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Figure 2: Limit performance of GrimK strategies. a, In the green region
(l > g/(1 − g)), GrimK strategies sustain a positive limit share of cooperators,
which increases with l, as indicated by a deeper shade of green. In the orange re-
gion (g < l < g/(1 − g)), the limit share of cooperators with GrimK is 0, but other
strategies may sustain positive cooperation in the limit. In the red region (l ≤ g),
individualistic records preclude cooperation. b, The limit share of cooperators as a
function of l when g = 1/2. At l = 1, there is a discontinuity; as l → ∞, the limit
share of cooperators approaches 1.
Note that with image-scoring strategies an individual’s image improves when they
cooperate, in contrast to GrimK strategies where cooperation only slows the deteri-
oration of one’s image. Modifying GrimK strategies by specifying that cooperation
improves an individual’s image does not help support cooperation: our results for max-
imum cooperation under GrimK strategies also hold for this more complicated class
of strategies.
GrimK strategies also satisfy desirable stability and convergence properties. These
derive from a key monotonicity property of GrimK strategies: when the distribution
of individual records is more favorable today, the same will be true tomorrow, because
players with better records both behave more cooperatively and induce more coop-
erative behavior from their partners. (See Methods for a precise statement.) From
this observation it can be shown that, whenever the initial distribution of records is
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more favorable than the best steady-state record distribution, the record distribution
converges to the best steady state. Similarly, whenever the initial distribution is less
favorable than the worst steady-state, convergence to the worst steady state obtains.
See Fig. 3. These additional robustness properties are not shared by more compli-
cated, non-monotone strategies that can sometimes support cooperation for a wider
range of parameters than GrimK.
a b
Figure 3: Convergence of the share of cooperators. a depicts trajectories for
the share of cooperators when γ = 0.8, ε = 0.02, and players use the Grim1 strategy; b
does the same for the Grim2 strategy. a, All trajectories converge to the unique steady
state; b, there are three steady states. Here “high” trajectories converge to the most
cooperative steady state, while “low” trajectories converge to the least cooperative
steady state. See Methods for details.
We also analyze evolutionary properties of GrimK equilibria. When g < l/(1 + l),
there is a sequence of GrimK equilibria that are “steady-state robust to mutants” and
attains the maximum limit cooperation share of l/(1+l). By this we mean that, when a
small fraction of players adopt some mutant GrimK ′ strategy where K ′ 6= K, there is a
steady-state distribution of records where it remains strictly optimal to play according
to GrimK. We also perform simulations of dynamic evolution when a population
playing a GrimK equilibrium is infected by a mutant population playing GrimK ′ for
some K ′ 6= K. (See Supplementary Information and Extended Data Fig. 1.)
Although our main analysis takes the basic unit of social interaction to be the
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standard 2-player PD, many social interactions involve multiple players: the manage-
ment of the commons and other public resources is a leading example [44, 83]. In the
Supplementary Information we establish that, when strategic complementarity is
sufficiently strong, robust cooperation in the multiplayer public goods game can be sup-
ported by a simple variant of GrimK strategies, wherein a player contributes to the
public good if and only if all of their current partners have good records. In contrast,
with strategic substitutability the unique strict equilibrium involves zero contribution.
As the n-player public good game is a generalization of the PD, this implies that in-
dividualistic records preclude cooperation in the PD with strategic substitutability, as
indicated in the red region in Fig. 2a.
We have shown how individualistic records robustly support indirect reciprocity in
supermodular PD and multiplayer public goods games. To place our results in context,
recall that scoring models do not provide robust incentives, while standing models com-
pute records as a recursive function of a player’s partners’ past actions and standing,
their partners’ actions and standing, and so on, and thus require more information than
may typically be available. The simplicity and power of individualistic records sug-
gests that they may be usefully adapted to specific settings where cooperation is based
on indirect reciprocity, such as online rating systems [87, 28], credit ratings [11, 59],
decentralized currencies [60, 13], and monitoring systems for conflict resolution [33].
Individualistic records may also prove useful in modeling the role of costly punishment
in the evolution of cooperation [35, 12, 19, 49].
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Methods
Here we summarize the model and mathematical results; further details are provided
in the Supplementary Information.
A Model of Social Cooperation with Individualistic Records
Time is discrete and doubly infinite: t ∈ {. . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}. There is a population
of individuals of unit mass, each with survival probability γ ∈ (0, 1), so each individual’s
lifespan is geometrically distributed with mean 1/(1− γ). An inflow of 1− γ newborn
players each period keeps the total population size constant. We thus have an infinite-
horizon dynamic model with overlapping generations of players [56, 78, 79, 21, 38].
Every period, individuals randomly match in pairs to play the PD (Fig. 1). Each
individual carries a record k ∈ N := {0, 1, 2, ...}. Newborns have record 0. Whenever
an individual plays D, their record increases by 1. Whenever an individual plays C,
their record remains constant with probability 1−ε and increases by 1 with probability
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ε; thus, ε ∈ (0, 1) measures the amount of noise in the system [61, 40, 43, 65, 7]. The
assumption that only plays of C are hit by noise simplifies some formulas but does not
affect any of our results.
When two players meet, they observe each other’s records and nothing else. A
strategy is a mapping s : N × N → {C,D}, with the convention that the first compo-
nent of the domain is a player’s own record and the second component is the current
opponent’s record. We assume that all players use the same strategy, noting that this
must be the case in every strict equilibrium in a symmetric, continuum-agent model
like ours. (Of course, players who have different records and/or meet opponents with
different records may take different actions.)
The state of the system µ ∈ ∆(N) describes the share of the population with each
record, where µk ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share with record k. When all players use strategy
s, let fs : ∆(N) → ∆(N) denote the resulting update map governing the evolution of
the state. (The formula for fs(µ) is in the Supplementary Information.) A steady
state under strategy s is a state µ such that fs(µ) = µ.
Given a strategy s and state µ, the expected flow payoff of a player with record k
is pik(s, µ) =
∑
k′ µk′u(s(k, k
′), s(k′, k)), where u is the PD payoff function. Denote the
probability that a player with current record k has record k′ t periods in the future
by φk(s, µ)
t(k′). The continuation payoff of a player with record k is then Vk(s, µ) =
(1 − γ)∑∞t=0 γt∑k′ φk(s, µ)t(k′)pik′(s, µ). Note that we have normalized continuation
payoffs by (1 − γ) to express them in per-period terms. A player’s objective is to
maximize their expected lifetime payoff.
A pair (s, µ) is an equilibrium if µ is a steady-state under s and, for each own record
k and opponent’s record k′, the prescribed action s(k, k′) ∈ {C,D} maximizes the ex-
pected lifetime payoff from the current period onward, given by (1− γ)u(a, s(k′, k)) +
γ
∑
k′′ (ρ(k, a)[k
′′])Vk′′(s, µ), over a ∈ {C,D}, where ρ(k, a)[k′′] denotes the probability
that a player with record k who takes action a acquires next-period record k′′. Note
that this expression depends on the opponent’s record only through the predicted
current-period opponent action, s(k′, k). In addition, the ratio (1− γ)/γ captures the
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weight that players place on their current payoff relative to their continuation payoff
from tomorrow on. We study limits where this ratio converges to 0, as opposed to
time-average payoffs which give exactly 0 weight to any one period’s payoff, because
in the latter case optimization and equilibrium impose unduly weak restrictions [39].
An equilibrium is strict if the maximizer is unique for all pairs (k, k′), i.e. the optimal
action is always unique. Note that this equilibrium definition allows agents to maxi-
mize over all possible strategies, as opposed to only strategies from some pre-selected
set. We focus on strict equilibria because they are robust, and they remain equilibria
under “small” perturbations of the model. Note that the strategy Always Defect, i.e.
s(k, k′) = D for all (k, k′), together with any steady state is always a strict equilib-
rium. Lemma 1 in the Supplementary Information characterizes the steady states
for any GrimK strategy, as well as the γ, ε, g, l parameters for which the steady states
are equilibria.
Limit Cooperation under GrimK Strategies
Under GrimK strategies, a matched pair of players cooperate if and only if both
records are below a pre-specified cutoff K: that is, s(k, k′) = C if max{k, k′} < K, and
s(k, k′) = D if max{k, k′} ≥ K.
We call an individual a cooperator if their record is below K and a defector other-
wise. Note that each individual may be a cooperator for some periods of their life and
a defector for other periods, rather than being pre-programmed to cooperate or defect
for their entire life.
Given an equilibrium strategy GrimK, let µC =
∑K−1
k=0 µk denote the corresponding
steady-state share of cooperators. Note that, in a steady state with cooperator share
µC , mutual cooperation is played in share (µC)2 of all matches. Let µC(γ, ε) be the
maximal share of cooperators in any tolerant trigger equilibrium (allowing for every
possible K) when the survival probability is γ and the noise level is ε.
Theorem 1 in the Supplementary Information characterizes the performance
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of equilibria in GrimK strategies in the double limit where the survival probability
approaches 1—so that players expect to live a long time and the “shadow of the future”
looms large—and the noise level approaches 0—so that records are reliable enough to
form the basis for incentives. (This long-lifespan/low-noise limit is the leading case of
interest in theoretical analyses of indirect reciprocity [78, 79, 31, 52, 98].) The theorem
shows that, in the double limit (γ, ε) → (1, 0), µ¯C(γ, ε) converges to l/(1 + l) when
g < l/(1 + l), and converges to 0 when g > l/(1 + l). The formal statement and proof
of this result are contained in the Supplementary Information.
Barring knife-edge cases, tolerant trigger strategies can thus robustly support posi-
tive cooperation in the double limit (γ, ε)→ (1, 0) if and only if the gain from defecting
against a partner who cooperates is significantly smaller than the loss from cooperat-
ing against a partner who defects: g < l/(1 + l). Moreover, the maximum level of
cooperation in this case is l/(1 + l). Here we explain the logic of this result.
We first show that g < µC in any GrimK equilibrium. Newborn individuals have
continuation payoff equal to the average payoff in the population, which is
(
µC
)2
. Thus,
since a newborn player plays C if and only if matched with a cooperator,
(
µC
)2
=
(1− γ)µC + γµCV C0 + γ(1− µC)V D0 , where V C0 and V D0 are the expected continuation
payoffs of a newborn player after playing C and D, respectively. Newborn players
have the highest continuation payoff in the population, so V C0 ≤ V0 =
(
µC
)2
. For a
newborn player to prefer not to cheat a cooperative partner, it must be that V D0 <
V C0 − (1− γ)g/γ, so when µC < 1 (as is necessarily the case with any noise),
(
µC
)2
< (1− γ)µC + γ (µC)2 − (1− γ)(1− µC)g.
This inequality can hold only if g < µC .
We next show that γ(1− ε)µC < l/(1 + l) in any GrimK equilibrium. The contin-
uation payoff VK−1 of an individual with record K − 1 satisfies VK−1 = (1 − γ)µC +
γ(1 − ε)µCVK−1, or VK−1 = (1 − γ)µC/(1 − γ(1 − ε)µC). A necessary condition for
an individual with record K − 1 to prefer to play D against a defector partner is
23
(1−γ)(−l)+γ(1−ε)VK−1 < 0, or l > γ(1−ε)VK−1/(1−γ). Combining this inequality
with the expression for VK−1 yields γ(1− ε)µC < l/(1 + l), which in the (γ, ε)→ (1, 0)
limit gives µC ≤ l/(1 + l).
We have established that tolerant trigger strategies can support positive cooperation
in the (γ, ε) → (1, 0) limit only if g ≤ l/(1 + l), and that the maximum cooperation
share cannot exceed l/(1 + l). The proof of Theorem 1 is completed by showing that
when g < l/(1 + l), by carefully choosing the tolerance level K, GrimK can support
cooperation shares arbitrarily close to any value between g and l/(1 + l) in equilibrium
when the survival probability is close to 1 and the noise level is close to 0.
Convergence of GrimK Strategies
Fix an arbitrary initial record distribution µ0 ∈ ∆(N). When all individuals use
GrimK strategies, the population share with record k at time t, µtk, evolves according
to
µt+10 = 1− γ + γ(1− ε)µC,tµt0,
µt+1k = γ(1− (1− ε)µC,t)µtk−1 + γ(1− ε)µC,tµtk for 0 < k < K,
where µC,t =
∑K−1
k=0 µ
t
k.
Fixing K, we say that distribution µ dominates (or is more favorable than) distri-
bution µ˜ if, for every k < K,
∑k
k˜=0 µk˜ ≥
∑k
k˜=0 µ˜k˜; that is, if for every k < K the share
of the population with record no worse than k is greater under distribution µ than
under distribution µ˜. Under the GrimK strategy, let µ¯ denote the steady state with
the largest share of cooperators, and let µ denote the steady state with the smallest
share of cooperators.
Theorem 2 in the Supplementary Information shows that, if the initial record
distribution is more favorable than µ¯, then the record distribution converges to µ¯;
similarly, if the initial record distribution is less favorable that µ, then the record
distribution converges to µ. Formally, if µ0 dominates µ¯, then limt→∞ µt = µ¯; similarly,
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if µ0 is dominated by µ, then limt→∞ µt = µ.
In Fig. 3a the blue trajectory corresponds to the initial distribution where all
players have record 0, the red trajectory is constant at the unique steady-state value
µC ≈ .2484, and the yellow trajectory corresponds to the initial distribution where all
players have defector records. Here all the trajectories converge to the unique steady
state. In Fig. 3b, the red trajectory is constant at the largest steady-state value
µC ≈ .9855, the yellow trajectory is constant at the intermediate steady-state value
µC ≈ .9184, and the purple trajectory is constant at the smallest steady-state value
µC ≈ .6471. The blue trajectory corresponds to the initial distribution where all players
have record 0 and converges to the largest steady-state share of cooperators. The green
trajectory corresponds to the initial distribution where all players have defector records
and converges to the smallest steady-state share of cooperators.
Extended Data Figure
See Supplementary Information for details.
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ab
Extended Data Figure 1: Evolutionary dynamics. a, The blue curve depicts the
evolution of the share of players that use Grim5 and are cooperators (i.e. have some
record k < 5). b, The average payoffs in the normal Grim5 population (blue curve)
and in the mutant Grim1 population (red curve).
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1 Related Work
Work on equilibrium cooperation in repeated games began with studies of reciprocal
altruism with general stage games where a fixed set of players interacts repeatedly with
a commonly known start date and a common notion of calendar time [37, 39, 2], and
has been expanded to allow for various sorts of noise and imperfect observability [42,
57, 54, 24, 27]. In contrast, most evolutionary analyses of repeated games have focused
on the prisoner’s dilemma [3, 17, 18, 32, 40, 14, 72, 73, 70, 6, 4, 77, 71, 53, 15], though
a few evolutionary analyses have considered more complex stage games [46, 94, 5].
Similarly, most laboratory and field studies of the effects of repeated interaction have
also focused on the prisoner’s dielmma [3, 33, 43, 25], though some papers consider
variants with an additional third action [29, 86].
Reciprocal altruism is an important force in long-term relationships among a rel-
atively small number players, such as business partnerships or collusive agreements
among firms, but there are many social settings where people manage to cooperate
even though direct reciprocation is impossible. These interactions are better modelled
as games with repeated random matching [88]. When the population is small compared
to the discount factor, cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma can be enforced by con-
tagion equilibria even when players have no information at all about each other’s past
actions [56, 31, 45]. These equilibria do not exist when the population is large com-
pared to the discount factor, so they are ruled out by our assumption of a continuum
population.
Previous research on indirect reciprocity in large populations has studied the en-
forcement of cooperation as an equilibrium using first-order information. Takahashi
[98] shows that cooperation can be supported as a strict equilibrium when the PD
exhibits strategic complementarity; however, his model does not allow noise or the
inflow of new players, and assumes players can use a commonly known calendar to
coordinate their play. Heller and Mohlin [48] show that, under strategic complemen-
tarity, the presence of a small share of players who always defect allows cooperation
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to be sustained as a stable (though not necessarily strict) equilibrium when players
are infinitely lived and infinitely patient and are restricted to using stationary strate-
gies. The broader importance of strategic complementarity has long been recognized
in economics [22, 41] and game theory [101, 66].
Many papers study the evolutionary selection of cooperation using image scoring
[93, 74, 78, 89, 102, 63, 68, 75, 36, 97, 8, 64]. With image scoring, each player has
first-order information about their partner, but conditions their action only on their
partner’s record and not on their own record. These strategies are never a strict
equilibrium, and are typically unstable in environments with noise [63, 85]. With more
complex “higher order” record systems such as standing, cooperation can typically be
enforced in a wide range of games [96, 81, 56, 67, 20, 78, 21, 84, 80, 100, 69]. Most
research has focused on the case where each player has only two states: for instance,
Ohtsuko and Iwasa [78, 79] consider all possible record systems of this type, and show
that only 8 of them allow an ESS with high levels of coooperation. Our first-order
records can take on any integer values, so they do not fall into this class, even though
behavior is determined by a binary classification of the records. Another innovation in
our model is to consider steady-state equilibria in a model with a constant inflow of
new players, even without any evolutionary dynamics. This approach has previously
been used to model industry dynamics in economics [51, 55], but is novel in the context
of models of cooperation and repeated games.
The key novel aspects of our framework may thus be summarized as follows:
1. Information (“records”) depends only on a player’s own past actions, but players
condition their behavior on their own record as well as their current partner’s
record.
2. The presence of strategic complementarity implies that such two-sided condition-
ing can generate strict incentives for cooperation.
3. Records are integers, and can therefore remain “good” even if they are repeatedly
hit by noise (as is inevitable when players are long-lived).
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4. The presence of a constant inflow of new players implies that the population
share with “good” records can remain positive even in steady state.
2 Model Description
Here we formally present the model and the steady-state and equilibrium concepts.
Time is discrete and doubly infinite: t ∈ {. . . ,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, . . .}. There is a unit
mass of individuals, each with survival probability γ ∈ (0, 1), and an inflow of 1 − γ
newborns each period to keep the population size constant.
Every period, individuals randomly match in pairs to play the PD (Fig. 1). Each
individual carries a record k ∈ N := {0, 1, 2, ...}. Newborns have record 0. When
two players meet, they observe each other’s records and nothing else. A strategy is a
mapping s : N × N → {C,D}. All players use the same strategy. When the players
use strategy s, the distribution over next-period records of a player with record k who
meets a player with record k′ is given by
φk,k′(s) =
k w/ prob. 1− ε, k + 1 w/ prob. ε if s(k, k
′) = C
k + 1 if s(k, k′) = D w/ prob. 1
.
The state of the system µ ∈ ∆(N) describes the share of the population with each
record, where µk ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share with record k. The evolution of the state
over time under strategy s is described by the update map fs : ∆(N) → ∆(N), given
by
fs(µ)[0] := 1− γ + γ
∑
k′
∑
k′′
µk′µk′′φk′,k′′(s)[0],
fs(µ)[k] := γ
∑
k′
∑
k′′
µk′µk′′φk′,k′′(s)[k] for k 6= 0.
A steady state under strategy s is a state µ such that fs(µ) = µ.
Given a strategy s and state µ, the expected flow payoff of a player with record k is
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pik(s, µ) =
∑
k′ µk′u(s(k, k
′), s(k′, k)), where u is the (normalized) PD payoff function
given by
u(a1, a2) =

1 if (a1, a2) = (C,C)
−l if (a1, a2) = (C,D)
1 + g if (a1, a2) = (D,C)
0 if (a1, a2) = (D,D)
.
Denote the probability that a player with current record k has record k′ t periods in
the future by φk(s, µ)
t(k′). The continuation payoff of a player with record k is then
Vk(s, µ) = (1−γ)
∑∞
t=0 γ
t
∑
k′ φk(s, µ)
t(k′)pik′(s, µ). A player’s objective is to maximize
their expected lifetime payoff.
A pair (s, µ) is an equilibrium if µ is a steady-state under s and, for each own
record k and opponent’s record k′, s(k, k′) ∈ {C,D} maximizes (1− γ)u(a, s(k′, k)) +
γ
∑
k′′ (ρ(k, a)[k
′′])Vk′′(s, µ) over a ∈ {C,D}, where ρ(k, a)[k′′] denotes the probability
that a player with record k who takes action a acquires next-period record k′′. An
equilibrium is strict if the maximizer is unique for all pairs (k, k′).
This equilibrium definition encompasses two forms of strategic robustness. First, we
allow agents to maximize over all possible strategies, as opposed to only strategies from
some pre-selected set. Second, we focus on strict equilibria, which remain equilibria
under “small” perturbations of the model.
3 Limit Cooperation under GrimK Strategies
Under GrimK strategies, a matched pair of players cooperate if and only if both
records are below a pre-specified cutoff K: that is, s(k, k′) = C if max{k, k′} < K and
s(k, k′) = D if max{k, k′} ≥ K.
We call an individual a cooperator if their record is below K and a defector other-
wise. Note that each individual may be a cooperator for some periods of their life and
a defector for other periods.
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Given an equilibrium strategy GrimK, let µC =
∑K−1
k=0 µk denote the corresponding
steady-state share of cooperators. Note that, in a steady state with cooperator share
µC , mutual cooperation is played in share (µC)2 of all matches. Let µC(γ, ε) be the
maximal share of cooperators in any tolerant trigger equilibrium (allowing for every
possible K) when the survival probability is γ and the noise level is ε.
The following theorem characterizes the performance of equilibria in GrimK strate-
gies in the double limit of interest [78, 79, 31, 52, 98] where the survival probability
approaches 1—so that players expect to live a long time and the “shadow of the future”
looms large—and the noise level approaches 0—so that players who play C are unlikely
to be recorded as playing D.
Theorem 1.
lim
(γ,ε)→(1,0)
µC(γ, ε) =

l
1+l
if g < l
1+l
0 if g > l
1+l
.
To prove the theorem, let β : (0, 1) × (0, 1) × (0, 1) → (0, 1) be the function given
by
β(γ, ε, µC) =
γ(1− (1− ε)µC)
1− γ(1− ε)µC . (1)
When players use GrimK strategies and the share of cooperators is µC , β(γ, ε, µC) is
the probability that a player with cooperator record k survives to reach record k + 1.
(This probability is the same for all k < K.)
Lemma 1. There is a GrimK equilibrium with cooperator share µC if and only if the
following conditions hold:
1. Feasibility:
µC = 1− β(γ, ε, µC)K . (2)
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2. Incentives:
(1− ε)(1− µC)
1− (1− ε)µC µ
C > g, (3)
µC <
1
γ(1− ε)
l
1 + l
. (4)
Note that µC = 0 solves (2) when K = 0. For any K > 0, 0 < 1 − β(γ, ε, µC)K
and 1 > 1 − β(γ, ε, 1)K , so by the intermediate value theorem, (2) has some solution
µ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, there is at least one steady state for every GrimK strategy. For some
strategies, there are multiple steady states, but never more than K + 1, because (2)
can be rewritten as a polynomial equation in µC with degree K + 1.
The upper bounds on the equilibrium share of cooperators in Table 1 are the
suprema of the µC ∈ (0, 1) that satisfy (3) and (4) for the corresponding (γ, ε) pa-
rameters. When no µC ∈ (0, 1) satisfy (3) and (4), the upper bound is 0, since Grim0
(where everyone plays D) is always a strict equilibrium.
To see how Part 2 of Theorem 1 comes from Lemma 1, note that
(1− ε)(1− µC)
1− (1− ε)µC ≤ 1.
Thus, (3) requires µC > g. Moreover, combining µC > g with (4) gives γ(1 − ε)g <
l/(1 + l). Taking the (γ, ε) → (1, 0) limit of this inequality gives g ≤ l/(1 + l). Thus,
when g > l/(1 + l), it follows that lim(γ,ε)→(1,0) µC(γ, ε) = 0.
All that remains is to show that lim(γ,ε)→(1,0) µC(γ, ε) = l/(1+ l) when g > l/(1+ l).
Since limε→0(1−ε)(1−µC)/(1−(1−ε)µC) = 1 for any fixed µC and lim(γ,ε)→(1,0) 1/(γ(1−
ε)) = 1, it follows that values of µC smaller than, but arbitrarily close to, l/(1+l) satisfy
(3) and (4) in the double limit. Thus, the only difficulty is showing the feasibility of
µC as a steady-state level of cooperation: because K must be an integer, some values
of µC cannot be generated by any K, for given values of γ and ε. The following result
shows that this “integer problem” becomes irrelevant in the limit. That is, any value
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of µC ∈ (0, 1) can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a feasible steady-state share
of cooperators for some GrimK strategy as (γ, ε)→ (1, 0).
Lemma 2. Fix any µC ∈ (0, 1). For all ∆ > 0, there exist γ < 1 and ε > 0 such
that, for all γ > γ and ε < ε, there exists µˆC that satisfies (2) for some K such that
|µˆC − µC | < ∆.
Proof of Lemma 1
The feasibility condition of Lemma 1 comes from the following lemma.
Lemma 3. In a GrimK equilibrium with cooperator share µC, µk = β(γ, ε, µ
C)k(1 −
β(γ, ε, µC)) for all k < K.
To see why the feasibility condition of Lemma 1 comes from Lemma 3, note that
µC =
K−1∑
k=0
β(γ, ε, µC)k(1− β(γ, ε, µC)) = 1− β(γ, ε, µC)K .
Proof of Lemma 3. The inflow into record 0 is 1− γ, while the outflow from record 0
is (1− γ(1− ε)µC)µ0. Setting these equal gives
µ0 =
1− γ
1− γ(1− ε)µC = 1− β(γ, ε, µ
C).
Additionally, for every 0 < k < K, the inflow into record k is γ(1 − (1 − ε)µC)µk−1,
while the outflow from record k is (1− γ(1− ε)µC)µk. Setting these equal gives
µk =
γ(1− (1− ε)µC)
1− γ(1− ε)µC µk−1 = β(γ, ε, µ
C)µk−1.
Combining this with µ0 = 1 − β(γ, ε, µC) gives µk = β(γ, ε, µC)k(1 − β(γ, ε, µC)) for
0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. 
The incentive constraint (3) of Lemma 4 guarantees that a record-0 cooperator
plays C against an opponent playing C, and the incentive constraint (1) guarantees
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that a record-(K − 1) cooperator plays D against an opponent playing D. Record-0
cooperators are the cooperators most tempted to defect against a cooperative opponent
and record-(K−1) cooperators are the cooperators most tempted to cooperate against
a defecting opponent, so these constraints guarantee the incentives of all cooperators
are satisfied.
Lemma 4. In a GrimK equilibrium with cooperator share µC,
Vk =
(1− β(γ, ε, µ
C)K−k)µC if k < K
0 if k ≥ K.
To see why the incentive constraints of Lemma 1 come from Lemma 4, note that
the expected continuation payoff of a record-0 player from playing C is (1−ε)V0 +εV1,
while the expected continuation payoff from playing D is V1. Thus, a record 0 player
strictly prefers to play C against an opponent playing C iff (1−ε)γ(V0−V1)/(1−γ) > g.
Combining Lemmas 3 and 4 gives
(1− ε) γ
1− γ (V0 − V1) =
1− ε
1− (1− ε)µC β(γ, ε, µ
C)KµC =
(1− ε)(1− µC)
1− (1− ε)µC µ
C ,
so (3) follows. Moreover, the expected continuation payoff of a record K−1 player from
playing C is (1 − ε)VK−1 + εVK , while the expected continuation payoff from playing
D is VK . Thus, a record K − 1 player strictly prefers to play D against an opponent
playing D iff (1− ε)γ(VK−1 − VK)/(1− γ) < l. Lemma 4 gives
(1− ε) γ
1− γ (VK−1 − VK) =
γ(1− ε)µC
1− γ(1− ε)µC ,
and setting this to be less than l gives (4).
Proof of Lemma 4. The flow payoff for any record k ≥ K is 0, so Vk = 0 for k ≥ K.
For k < K, Vk = (1 − γ)µC + γ(1 − ε)µCVk + γ(1 − (1 − ε)µC)Vk+1, which gives
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Vk = (1 − β(γ, ε, µC))µC + β(γ, ε, µC)Vk+1. Combining this with VK = 0 gives Vk =
(1− β(γ, ε, µC)K−k)µC for k < K. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Let K˜ : (0, 1)× (0, 1)× (0, 1)→ R+ be the function given by
K˜(γ, ε, µC) =
ln(1− µC)
ln(β(γ, ε, µC))
. (5)
By construction, K˜(γ, ε, µC) is the unique K ∈ R+ such that µC = 1 − β(γ, ε, µC)K .
Let d : (0, 1]× [0, 1)× (0, 1)→ R be the function given by
d(γ, ε, µC) =
1 + ln(1− µ
C)(1− µC)
∂β
∂µC
(γ,ε,µC)
β(γ,ε,µC) ln(β(γ,ε,µC))
if γ < 1
1 + (1−ε) ln(1−µ
C)(1−µC)
1−(1−ε)µC if γ = 1
.
The µC derivative of K˜(γ, ε, µC) is related to d(γ, ε, µC) by the following lemma.
Lemma 5. K˜ : (0, 1)×(0, 1)×(0, 1)→ R+ is differentiable in µC with derivative given
by
∂K˜
∂µC
(γ, ε, µC) = − d(γ, ε, µ
C)
(1− µC) ln(β(γ, ε, µC)) .
Proof of Lemma 5. From (5), it follows that K˜(γ, ε, µC) is differentiable in µC with
derivative given by
∂K˜
∂µC
(γ, ε, µC) = −
ln(β(γ,ε,µC))
1−µC +
ln(1−µC) ∂β
∂µC
(γ,ε,µC)
β(γ,ε,µC)
ln(β(γ, ε, µC))2
= −
1 + ln(1− µC)(1− µC)
∂β
∂µC
(γ,ε,µC)
β(γ,ε,µC) ln(β(γ,ε,µC))
(1− µC) ln(β(γ, ε, µC))
= − d(γ, ε, µ
C)
(1− µC) ln(β(γ, ε, µC)) . 
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The following two lemmas concern properties of d(γ, ε, µC) that will be useful for
the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 6. d : (0, 1]× [0, 1)× (0, 1)→ R is well-defined and continuous.
Proof of Lemma 6. Since β(γ, ε, µC) is differentiable and only takes values in (0, 1),
it follows that d(γ, ε, µC) is well-defined. Moreover, since β(γ, ε, µC) is continuously
differentiable for all µC ∈ (0, 1), d(γ, ε, µC) is continuous for γ < 1. All that remains
is to check that d(γ, ε, µC) is continuous for γ = 1.
First, note that d(1, ε, µC) is continuous in (ε, µC). Thus, we need only check the
limit in which γ approaches 1, but never equals 1. Note that
∂β
∂µC
(γ, ε, µC)
β(γ, ε, µC) ln(β(γ, ε, µC))
= −
γ(1−ε)(1−γ)
(1−γ(1−ε)µC)2
β(γ, ε, µC) ln(β(γ, ε, µC))
= −
( γ(1− ε)
β(γ, ε, µC)(1− γ(1− ε)µC)
)(1− β(γ, ε, µC)
ln(β(γ, ε, µC))
)
.
(6)
It is clear that
lim
(γ˜,ε˜,µ˜C)→(1,ε,µC)
γ˜ 6=1
γ˜(1− ε˜)
β(γ˜, ε˜, µ˜C)(1− γ˜(1− ε˜)µ˜C)
=
1− ε
(1− (1− ε)µC) (7)
for all (ε, µC) ∈ [0, 1)× (0, 1). For γ close to 1,
ln(β(γ, ε, µC)) = β(γ, ε, µC)− 1 +O((β(γ, ε, µC)− 1)2).
Thus,
lim
(γ˜,ε˜,µ˜)→(1,ε,µC)
γ˜ 6=1
1− β(γ˜, ε˜, µ˜C)
ln(β(γ˜, ε˜, µ˜C))
= −1 (8)
for all (ε, µC) ∈ [0, 1)× (0, 1). Equations 6, 7, and 8 together imply that d(γ, ε, µC) is
continuous for γ = 1. 
Lemma 7. d(1, 0, µC) has precisely one zero in µC ∈ (0, 1), and the zero is located at
µC = 1− 1/e.
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Proof of Lemma 7. This follows from the fact that d(1, 0, µC) = 1 + ln(1− µC). 
With these preliminaries established, we now present the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix some µ˜C ∈ (0, 1) such that µ˜C 6= 1 − 1/e. Lemma 7 says
d(1, 0, µ˜C) 6= 0. Because of this and the continuity of d, there exist some λ > 0 and
some δ > 0, γ′ < 1, and ε > 0 such that |d(γ, ε, µC)| > λ for all γ > γ′, ε < ε, and
|µC − µ˜C | < δ.
Additionally, note that limγ→1 inf(ε,µC)∈(0,ε)×(µC−δ,µC+δ) β(γ, ε, µC) = 1. Together
these facts imply that there exists some γ < 1 such that∣∣∣∣∣ ∂K˜∂µC (γ, ε, µC)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ d(γ, ε, µC)(1− µC) ln(β(γ, ε, µC))
∣∣∣∣ > 2min{δ,∆}
and K˜(γ, ε, µC) ≥ 1 for all γ > γ, ε < ε, and |µC − µ˜C | < δ. It thus follows that
sup
|µC−µ˜C |≤min{δ,∆}
|K˜(γ, ε, µC)− K˜(γ, ε, µ˜C)| > 1
for all γ > γ, ε < ε. Hence, there exists some µˆC within ∆ of µ˜C and some non-
negative integer Kˆ such that K˜(γ, ε, µˆC) = Kˆ, which implies that µˆC is feasible since
µˆC = 1− β(γ, ε, µˆC)Kˆ . 
4 Convergence of GrimK Strategies
We now derive a key stability property of GrimK strategies. Fix an arbitrary ini-
tial record distribution µ0 ∈ ∆(N). When all individuals use GrimK strategies, the
population share with record k at time t, µtk, evolves according to
µt+10 = 1− γ + γ(1− ε)µC,tµt0,
µt+1k = γ(1− (1− ε)µC,t)µtk−1 + γ(1− ε)µC,tµtk for 0 < k < K,
(9)
where µC,t =
∑K−1
k=0 µ
t
k.
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Fixing K, we say that distribution µ dominates (or is more favorable than) distri-
bution µ˜ if, for every k < K,
∑k
k˜=0 µk˜ ≥
∑k
k˜=0 µ˜k˜; that is, if for every k < K the share
of the population with record no worse than k is greater under distribution µ than
under distribution µ˜. Under the GrimK strategy, let µ¯ denote the steady state with
the largest share of cooperators, and let µ denote the steady state with the smallest
share of cooperators.
Theorem 2.
1. If µ0 dominates µ¯, then limt→∞ µt = µ¯.
2. If µ0 is dominated by µ, then limt→∞ µt = µ.
Let xk =
∑k
k˜=0 µk˜ denote the share of the population with record no worse than k.
From Equation 9, it follows that
xt+10 = 1− γ + γ(1− ε)xtK−1xt0,
xt+1k = 1− γ + γxtk−1 + γ(1− ε)xtK−1(xtk − xtk−1) for 0 < k < K.
(10)
To see this, note that x0 = µ0 and xK−1 = µC , so rewriting the first line in Equation
9 gives the first line in Equation 10. Additionally, for 0 < k < K, Equation 9 gives
xt+1k =
∑
k˜≤k
µt+1
k˜
= 1− γ + γ
∑
k˜≤k−1
µt
k˜−1 + γ(1− ε)µC,tµtk,
= 1− γ + γxtk−1 + γ(1− ε)xtK−1(xtk − xtk−1).
Lemma 8. The update map in Equation 10 is weakly increasing: If (xt0, ..., x
t
K−1) ≥
(x˜t0, ..., x˜
t
K−1), then (x
t+1
0 , ..., x
t+1
K−1) ≥ (x˜t+10 , ..., x˜t+1K−1).
Proof of Lemma 8. The right-hand side of the first line in Equation 10 depends only on
the product of xt0 and x
t
K−1, and it is strictly increasing in this product. The right-hand
side of the second line in Equation 10 depends only on xtk−1, x
t
k, and x
t
K−1, and, holding
fixed any two of these variables, it is weakly increasing in the third variable. 
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Proof of Theorem 2. We prove the first statement of Theorem 2. A similar argument
handles the second statement. Let (x˜t0, ..., x˜
t
K−1) denote the time-path corresponding
to the highest possible initial conditions, i.e. (x˜00, ..., x˜
0
K−1) = (1, ..., 1). By Lemma 8,
(x˜t+10 , ..., x˜
t+1
K−1) ≤ (x˜t0, ..., x˜tK−1) for all t. Thus, it follows that limt→∞(x˜t0, ..., x˜tK−1) =
inft(x˜
t
0, ..., x˜
t
K−1), so in particular limt→∞(x˜
t
0, ..., x˜
t
K−1) exists. Since the update rules in
Equation 10 are continuous, it follows that limt→∞(x˜t0, ..., x˜
t
K−1) must be a steady state
of the system. By Lemma 8 and the fact that (x0, ..., xK−1) is the steady state with
the highest share of cooperators, it follows that limt→∞(x˜t0, ..., x˜
t
K−1) = (x0, ..., xK−1).
Now, fix some (x00, ..., x
0
K−1) ≥ (x0, ..., xK−1). By Lemma 8,
(x0, ..., xK−1) ≤ (xt0, ..., xtK−1) ≤ (x˜t0, ..., x˜tK−1)
for all t, so it follows that limt→∞(xt0, ..., x
t
K−1) = (x0, ..., xK−1). 
5 Evolutionary Analysis
We have so far analyzed the efficiency of GrimK equilibrium steady states (Theorem
1) and convergence to such steady states when all players use the GrimK strategy
(Theorem 2). To further examine the robustness of GrimK strategies, we now perform
two types of evolutionary analysis. In Section 5.1, we show that, when g < l/(1 + l),
there are sequences of GrimK equilibria that obtain the maximum cooperator share of
l/(1 + l) as (γ, ε)→ (1, 0) that are robust to invasion by a small mass of mutants who
follow any other GrimK ′ strategy, such as Always Defect (i.e., Grim0). In Section
5.2, we report simulations of the evolutionary dynamic when a GrimK steady state is
invaded by mutants playing another GrimK ′ strategy.
5.1 Steady-State Robustness
We consider the following notion of steady-state robustness.
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Definition 1. A GrimK equilibrium with share of cooperators µC is steady-state
robust to mutants if, for every K ′ 6= K and α > 0, there exists some δ > 0 such
that when the share of players playing GrimK is 1− δ and the share of players playing
GrimK ′ is δ with δ < δ, then
• There is a steady state where the fraction of players playing GrimK that are
cooperators, µ˜C, satisfies |µ˜C − µC | < α, and
• It is strictly optimal to play GrimK.
We show that, whenever strategic complementarities are strong enough to support
a cooperative GrimK equilibrium, there is a sequence of GrimK equilibria that are
robust to mutants and attains the maximum cooperation level of l/(1+l) when expected
lifespans are long and noise is small.
Theorem 3. Suppose that g < l/(1 + l). There is a family of GrimK equilibria giving
a share of cooperators µC(γ, ε) for parameters γ, ε such that:
1. lim(γ,ε)→(1,0) µC(γ, ε) = l/(1 + l), and
2. There is some γ < 1 and ε > 0 such that, when γ > γ and ε < ε, the GrimK
equilibrium with share of cooperators µC(γ, ε) is steady-state robust to mutants.
Proof. We assume that K ′ < K; the proof for K ′ > K is analogous. Fix some g < µ˜C <
l/(1 + l) satisfying µ˜C 6= 1− 1/e. By Lemmas 1 and 2, we know that there exists some
family of tolerant trigger strategy equilibria with share of cooperators µ˜C(γ, ε) such
that lim(γ,ε)→(1,0) µ˜C(γ, ε) = µ˜C . Fix some γ, ε, and consider the modified environment
where share 1−δ of the players use the GrimK strategy corresponding to µ˜C(γ, ε) and
share δ of the players use some other GrimK ′.
Let µKK denote the share of the players playing GrimK that have record less than
K, let µKK′ be the share of GrimK players with record less than K
′, and let µK
′
K′ be the
share of the players playing GrimK ′ that have record less than K ′. Then in an steady
state we have
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µKK = 1− β(γ, ε, (1− δ)µKK + δµK
′
K )
K ,
µKK′ = 1− β(γ, ε, (1− δ)µKK + δµK
′
K )
K′ ,
µK
′
K = 1− γK−K
′
β(γ, ε, (1− δ)µKK′ + δµK
′
K′)
K′ ,
µK
′
K′ = 1− β(γ, ε, (1− δ)µKK′ + δµK
′
K′)
K′ .
This can be rewritten as
fKK (γ, ε, µ
K
K , µ
K
K′ , µ
K′
K , µ
K′
K′) := µ
K
K + β(γ, ε, (1− δ)µKK + δµK
′
K )
K − 1 = 0,
fKK′(γ, ε, µ
K
K , µ
K
K′ , µ
K′
K , µ
K′
K′) := µ
K
K′ + β(γ, ε, (1− δ)µKK + δµK
′
K )
K′ − 1 = 0,
fK
′
K (γ, ε, µ
K
K , µ
K
K′ , µ
K′
K , µ
K′
K′) := µ
K′
K + γ
K−K′β(γ, ε, (1− δ)µKK′ + δµK
′
K′)
K′ − 1 = 0,
fK
′
K′ (γ, ε, µ
K
K , µ
K
K′ , µ
K′
K , µ
K′
K′) := µ
K′
K′ + β(γ, ε, (1− δ)µKK′ + δµK
′
K′)
K′ − 1 = 0.
(11)
Note that µKK = µ˜
C(γ, ε), µKK′ = 1− β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))K′ , µK′K = 1− γK−K′β(γ, ε, 1−
β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))K
′
)K
′
, µK
′
K′ = 1−β(γ, ε, 1−β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))K′)K′ solves (11) when δ = 0.
The partial derivatives of the left-hand side of (11) evaluated at this point are given
by 
∂fKK
∂µKK
∂fKK
∂µK
K′
∂fKK
∂µK
′
K
∂fKK
∂µK
′
K′
∂fK
K′
∂µKK
∂fK
K′
∂µK
K′
∂fK
K′
∂µK
′
K
∂fK
K′
∂µK
′
K′
∂fK
′
K
∂µKK
∂fK
′
K
∂µK
K′
∂fK
′
K
∂µK
′
K
∂fK
′
K
∂µK
′
K′
∂fK
′
K′
∂µKK
∂fK
′
K′
∂µK
K′
∂fK
′
K′
∂µK
′
K
∂fK
′
K′
∂µK
′
K′

=

1 +KβK−1 ∂β
∂µC
0 0 0
K ′βK
′−1 ∂β
∂µC
1 0 0
0 γK−K
′
K ′βK
′−1 ∂β
∂µC
1 0
0 K ′βK
′−1 ∂β
∂µC
0 1
 .
(12)
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Because µ˜C(γ, ε) = 1−β(γ, ε, µC(γ, ε))K andK = ln(1−µ˜C(γ, ε))/ ln(β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))),
1 +Kβ(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))K−1
∂β
∂µC
(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))
=1 + ln(1− µ˜C(γ, ε))(1− µ˜C(γ, ε))
∂β
∂µC
(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))
β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε)) ln(β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε)))
.
Recall that
β(γ, ε, µC) =
γ(1− (1− ε)µC)
1− γ(1− ε)µC = 1−
1− γ
1− γ(1− ε)µC .
Thus, lim(γ,ε)→(1,0) β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε)) = 1. Hence, it follows that for high γ and small ε,
ln(β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))) = −(1− β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))) +O(1− β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))2. Moreover,
∂β
∂µC
(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε)) = − (1− γ)γ(1− ε)
(1− γ(1− ε)µC(γ, ε))2
= − γ(1− ε)
1− γ(1− ε)µ˜C(γ, ε)(1− β(γ, ε, µ˜
C(γ, ε))).
Combining these results gives us
lim
(γ,ε)→(1,0)
∂β
∂µC
(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))
β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε)) ln(β(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε)))
=
1
1− µ˜C .
Since lim(γ,ε)→(1,0) ln(1− µ˜C(γ, ε))(1− µ˜C(γ, ε)) = ln(1− µ˜C)(1− µ˜C), it further follows
that
lim
(γ,ε)→(1,0)
1 +Kβ(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε))K−1
∂β
∂µC
(γ, ε, µ˜C(γ, ε)) = 1 + ln(1− µ˜). (13)
Since µ˜ 6= 1−1/e, we have 1+ln(1− µ˜) 6= 0. Thus, using (13), we conclude that the
determinant of the matrix of partial derivatives in (12) is non-zero, and so can appeal
to the implicit function theorem to conclude that for sufficiently high γ and small ε,
for each K ′ 6= K and α > 0, there is some δ1 > 0 such that when the share of players
playing GrimK is 1 − δ and the share of players playing GrimK ′ is δ with δ < δ1,
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there is a steady state where the fraction of players using GrimK that are cooperators,
µC
′
, is such that |µC′ − µ˜C(γ, ε)| < α. Additionally, because the GrimK equilibrium
with share of cooperators µ˜C(γ, ε) is a strict equilibrium where players have uniformly
strict incentives to play according to GrimK at every own record and partner record,
it follows that there is some 0 < δ < δ1 such that, when the share of players playing
GrimK is 1 − δ and the share of players playing GrimK ′ is δ with δ < δ, there is a
steady state with share of cooperators µC
′
such that |µC′ − µ˜C(γ, ε)| < α where it is
strictly optimal to play GrimK.

5.2 Dynamics
We performed a simulation to capture dynamic evolution. We considered a population
initially playing the Grim5 equilibrium with steady-state share of cooperators of µC ≈
0.8998 when γ = 0.9, ε = 0.1, g = 0.4, l = 2.8 that is infected with a mutant population
playing Grim1 at t = 0. The initial share of the population that played Grim5 was .95,
and the complementary share of 0.05 played Grim1. At t = 0, all of the Grim1 mutants
had record 0, while the record shares of the Grim5 population were proportional to
those in the original steady state. At period t, the players match, observe each others’
records (but not what population their opponent belongs to), and then play as their
strategy dictates. We denote the average payoff of the Grim5 players and Grim1
players at period t by piGrim5,t and piGrim1,t, respectively.
The evolution of the system from period t−1 to t was driven by the average payoffs
and sizes of the two populations at t − 1. In particular, at any period t > 0, the
share of the newborn players that belonged to the Grim5 population (µNGrim5,t) was
proportional to the product of µGrim5,t−1 and piGrim5,t−1, and similarly the share of
the 1 − γ newborn players that belonged to the Grim1 population (µNGrim1,t) was
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proportional to the product of µGrim1,t−1 and piGrim1,t−1. Formally,
µNGrim5,t =
µGrim5,t−1piGrim5,t−1
µGrim5,t−1piGrim5,t−1 + µGrim1,t−1piGrim1,t−1
(1− γ)
µNGrim1,t =
µGrim1,t−1piGrim1,t−1
µGrim5,t−1piGrim5,t−1 + µGrim1,t−1piGrim1,t−1
(1− γ).
Extended Data Fig. 1 presents the results of this simulation. Extended Data
Fig. 1a depicts the evolution of the share of players that use Grim5 and are cooper-
ators (i.e. have record k < 5). Initially, this share is below the steady-state value of
≈ 0.8998, and is decreasing as the Grim1 mutants obtain high payoffs relative to the
normal Grim5 players on average. However, the share of cooperator Grim5 players
eventually begins to increase and approaches its steady-state value as the mutants die
out.
The reason the mutants eventually die out is that their payoffs eventually decline,
as depicted in Extended Data Fig. 1b. The tendency of the Grim1 players to
defect means that they tend to move to high records relatively quickly, and so while
they initially receive a high payoff from defecting against cooperators, this advantage
is short lived.
We found similar results when the mutant population plays Grim9 rather than
Grim1, although the average payoff in the mutant population never exceeded that in
the normal population. And we again found similar results when a population initially
playing the Grim8 equilibrium with steady-state share of cooperators of µC ≈ 0.613315
and γ = 0.95, ε = 0.05, g = 0.5, l = 4 is infected with a mutant population playing
Grim3 at t = 0, and for when it is infected with a mutant population playing Grim13.
6 Public Goods
Our analysis so far has taken the basic unit of social interaction to be the standard
2-player prisoner’s dilemma. However, there are important social interactions that
involve many players: the management of the commons and other public resources is
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a leading example [44, 26, 10, 83]. Such multiplayer public goods games have been
the subject of extensive theoretical and experimental research [68, 91, 62, 34, 82, 9].
Here we show that a simple variant of GrimK strategies can support positive robust
cooperation in the multiplayer public goods game when there is sufficient strategic
complementarity.
We use the same model as considered so far, except that now in each period the
players randomly match in groups of size n, for some fixed integer n ≥ 2. All players in
each group simultaneously decide whether to Contribute (C) or Not Contribute (D).
If exactly x of the n players in the group contribute, each group member receives a
benefit of f(x) ≥ 0, where f : N→ R+ is a strictly increasing function with f(0) = 0.
In addition, each player who contributes incurs a private cost of c > 0. This coincides
with the 2-player PD when n = 2, f(1) = 1 + g, f(2) = l + 2 + g, and c = l + 1 + g.
For each x ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}, let ∆(x) = f(x+1)−f(x) denote the marginal benefit to
each member when there is an additional contribution. Assume that ∆(x) < c < n∆(x)
for each x ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}. This assumption makes the public good game an n-player
PD, in that D is the selfishly optimal action while everyone playing C is socially
optimal.
We consider the same record system as in the 2-player PD: Newborns have record
0. If a player plays D, their record increases by 1. If a player plays C, their record
increases by 1 with probability ε > 0, and remains constant with probability 1− ε.
As in the 2-player PD, we find that a key determinant of the prospects for robust
cooperation is the degree of strategic complementarity or substitutability in the social
dilemma. In the public good game, we say that the interaction exhibits strategic
complementarity if ∆(x) is increasing in x (i.e., contributing is more valuable when
more partners contribute), and exhibits strategic substitutability if ∆(x) is decreasing
in x.
We first show that with strategic substitutability the unique strict equilibrium is
Never Contribute. This generalizes our finding that Always Defect is the unique strict
equilibrium in the 2-player PD when g ≥ l.
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Theorem 4. For any n ≥ 2, if the public good game exhibits strategic substitutability,
the unique strict equilibrium is Never Contribute.
Proof. Suppose n players who all have the same record k meet. By symmetry, either
they all contribute or none of them contribute. In the former case, contributing is opti-
mal for a record-k player when all partners contribute, so by strategic substitutability
contributing is also optimal for a record-k player when a smaller number of partners
contribute. Thus, a record-k player contributes regardless of their partners’ records. In
the latter case, not contributing is optimal for a record-k player when no partners con-
tribute, so by strategic substitutability not contributing is also optimal for a record-k
player when a larger number of partners contribute.
We have established that, for each k, record-k players do not condition their be-
havior on their opponents’ records. Hence, the distribution of future opposing actions
faced by any player is independent of their record. This implies that not contributing
is always optimal. 
We now turn to the case of strategic complementarity and consider the follow-
ing simple generalization of GrimK strategies: Records k < K are considered to be
“good,” while records k ≥ K are considered “bad.” When n players meet, they all
contribute if all of their records are good; otherwise, none of them contribute.
For GrimK strategies to form an equilibrium, two incentive constraints must be
satisfied: First, a player with record 0 (the “safest” good record) must want to con-
tribute in a group with n− 1 other good-record players. Second, a player with record
K − 1 (the “most fragile” good record) must not want to contribute in a group where
no one else contributes.
We let g = c−∆(n− 1) and l = c−∆(0). Note that
V0 = (1− γ)(µC)n−1(f(n)− c) + γ(1− ε)(µC)n−1V0 + γ(1− (1− ε)(µC)n−1)V1,
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which gives
(1− ε) γ
1− γ (V0 − V1) =
1− ε
1− (1− ε)(µC)n−1 ((µ
C)n−1(f(n)− c)− V0).
By a similar argument to Lemma 4, it can be established that V0 = µ
C(µC)n−1(f(n)−c).
We thus find that the cooperation constraint for a record 0 player is
1− ε
1− (1− ε)(µC)n−1 (1− µ
C)(µC)n−1(f(n)− c) > g. (14)
In addition,
VK−1 = (1− γ)(µC)n−1(f(n)− c) + γ(1− ε)(µC)n−1VK−1
gives
(1− ε) γ
1− γVK−1 =
γ(1− ε)
1− γ(1− ε)(µC)n−1 (µ
C)n−1(f(n)− c).
Thus, the defection constraint for a record K − 1 player is
γ(1− ε)
1− γ(1− ε)(µC)n−1 (µ
C)n−1(f(n)− c) < l,
which gives
(µC)n−1 <
1
γ(1− ε)
l
f(n)− c+ l ⇔ µ
C <
(
1
γ(1− ε)
) 1
n−1
(
l
f(n)− c+ l
) 1
n−1
. (15)
This gives µC ≤ (l/(f(n)− c+ l))1/(n−1) in the (γ, ε)→ (1, 0) limit.
Moreover, in the limit where ε→ 0, (14) gives
1− µC
1− (µC)n−1 (µ
C)n−1(f(n)− c) ≥ g ⇔ 1∑n−2
m=0(µ
C)m
(µC)n−1(f(n)− c) ≥ g.
Note that (µC)n−1/
∑n−2
m=0(µ
C)m is increasing in µC . Thus, this inequality, along with
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the previous upper bound for µC , puts the following requirement on the parameters:
1− ( l
f(n)−c+l)
1
n−1
f(n)−c
f(n)−c+l
l
f(n)− c+ l (f(n)− c) ≥ g,
which simplifies to
g ≤
(
1−
(
l
f(n)− c+ l
) 1
n−1
)
l. (16)
So far we have established (16), which is a necessary condition on the g, l parameters
for any cooperation to be sustainable with GrimK strategies in the (γ, ε) → (1, 0)
limit. We can further characterize the maximum limit share of cooperators in GrimK
equilibria using very similar arguments as those in Lemmas 1 and 2.
Theorem 5.
lim
(γ,ε)→(1,0)
µCn (γ, ε) =

(
l
f(n)−c+l
) 1
n−1
if g <
(
1−
(
l
f(n)−c+l
) 1
n−1
)
l
0 if g >
(
1−
(
l
f(n)−c+l
) 1
n−1
)
l
.
Theorem 5 shows that GrimK strategies can support robust social cooperation in
the n-player public goods game in much the same manner as in the 2-player PD. To
see how this result reduces to Theorem 1 in the 2-player PD, note that f(2) − c = 1,
so (l/(f(n)− c+ l))1/(n−1) = l/(1 + l) when n = 2.
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